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Abstract: a number of business failures have not been reported in Nigeria arising from inability to payback 
nor does service debts .This paper empirically investigate the relationship between capital structure and firm 
performance in the Nigerian listed firms. A sample of 30listed firms out of a population of 173 were examined 
from 2005 to 2014 using multiple regression tools.  Two hypotheses were formulated and tested using 
descriptive statistics and an econometric panel data technique to analyze the gathered data. An insignificantly 
negative correlation was found between financial leverage and ROA on one hand and a significantly negative 
relationship between debt/equity mix and ROE on the other hand. It is therefore recommended that firms 
should use long term liabilities to finance firm’s activities and mix debt/equity appropriately by ensuring that 
debt financing ratio is lower to enhance corporate performance and survival. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The management of corporate organizations must make decisions regarding the capital structure because 
such decision will impact on the performance of the firms (Gill et al., 2009). Error in this area may lead to 
financial distress and even bankruptcy. Two schools of thought are more pronounced regarding optimal 
capital structure- Relevant and Irrelevant theories.  The former sees capital structure as relevant believing 
that the optimal mix of debt and equity can minimize the overall cost of capital and maximize the value of the 
firm. The latter school pioneered by Modigliani and Miller  even though under unrealistic assumptions argued 
that the worth of the firm is unaffected by financing decision  because firm’s value is a function of  underlying 
profitability and  investment risk (Baral & Stern, 2011; Van Horne James, 2002). In Nigeria today it is 
important that firms balance the choice of financing by considering the relationship between capital structure 
and financial performance because this is highly significant to their long-term survival. Even though financial 
leverage provides tax benefits to the firm,  it  also increases the uncertainty surrounding the firm ability to 
service its debt and obligations as at when due (Shubita & Alsawalhah, 2012). Many firms borrow without 
proper planning on how the debt will be serviced. In many of the firms, managers and practitioners lack 
guidance for attaining optimal financing decision (Kibeti, Kibeti, Tenei & Matidol, 2011). From observations 
many of the challenges encountered by listed companies are largely attributed to financing (Chebii, 
Kipchumba & Wasike, 2011). Despite this, insignificant attention has been paid to it in the past. Research in 
this area has only produced little empirical evidence focusing on capital structure in Nigerian corporate 
decisions. These explain why companies are folding up unannounced while others are taken over by 
creditors. This study aimed at bridging this gap. This paper investigates the relationship between financial 
leverage and profitability using data from selected publicly traded firms. It equally examines whether, 
financial leverage mix and financial performance are correlated in the Nigerian listed firms. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Debt and equity option has been a discussion subject dated back to the era when (Modigliani & Miller, 1958) 
argued that capital structure is unrelated to firm’s value. However, this claim was reversed later to state that 
firm’s value is maximized when debt is the only source of finance(Modigliani & Miller, 1963); Jiang et al., 
2008). Different theories of capital structure abound in financial management literature. The net income  
approach  was propounded in 1952 (Durand, 1952)  stating that firm can increase its value or reduce capital 
cost with the use of debt . Net operating income approach though equally propounded by Durand is converse 
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to the net income model. This approach argued that the firm’s value and capital cost are not dependent on 
capital structure. Thus, mixing debt and equity capital judiciously cannot increase firm’s value. These are two 
extreme approaches to capital structure. Solomon (1963) brought out an intermediate approach to the capital 
structure. This theory  argues that firm’s value increases to a certain level of debt capital and after then it 
tends to remain constant with a moderate use of debt  capital, and ultimately the firm’s value decreases 
(Solomon, 1963). Trade-off theory posits that the maximization of firm’s value is attainable at an optimal level 
of capital structure. Whenever a firm has deviated from its optimum, it has several options. It will either be 
over-levered where it can retire debt or issue equity or under levered where it can repurchase shares or issue 
debt. For the fact that these actions are costly, altering the leverage ratio becomes burdensome, implying 
slower adjustment to optimal leverage. For instance, the debt marginal benefits will equal the marginal costs 
of debt and the maximization of firm’s  performance is achieved (Tang & Jang, 2007); Jiang et al., 2008). Debt 
is less expensive because it   is tax deductible when compared with equity financing. 
 
Pecking-order propounded by Myers (1984), Naimi, Nor, Rohami & Wan-Hussin (2010) and Iqbal et al. 
(2012) simply explains why companies behave  the way they do in their financing decision. They claimed that 
firms will first exploit internal financing such as retained profits before considering external sources for 
rationality and safety, this is less expensive. To reduce asymmetric information and other financing costs, 
firms should first finance investments with retained earnings, then with safe debt (newly issued debt that is 
default-risk free), then with risky debt, and finally with equity (Myers, 1984; Ramakrishnan et al., 2015). If 
outside is needed, firms will first issue the safest security starting with debt, then possibly hybrid securities 
such as convertible bonds then perhaps equity as a last resort because investors consider equity riskier than 
debt. From observation, most profitable companies within an industry tend to have the least amount of 
leverage. According to Myers (1984), firms’ concern should be with the future as well as the current financing 
costs. Possibilities abound for large investment firms to engage in low-risk capacity in order to avoid 
forfeiting future investments or financing them with new risky securities. 
 
Finally, the agency theory of (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) claimed there is the existence of 
managers/stockholders personal interest conflict. Companies are established and financed by the owners 
with the intention of increasing their wealth through the financial performance of the firm. The achievement 
of this objective becomes complicated as the firm increases in size and scope and because such firm might not 
be managed directly by the owners, therefore there is a separation between the management and the owners. 
Then the interest of managers might not align with those of investors thereby leading to managers seeking 
self- interest.  Jensen (1986) argued that managers will use available discretionary amount for perquisites. 
This relationship will lead to the agency problem with the associated agency cost. Again, as a result of the 
owners not having full information when a decision is made, may  make it impossible for the owner to 
determine whether the manager is acting in the best interest of the firm or not. (Atrill & McLaney, 2009) also 
confirm the existence of agency problem even when the managers are out to take decisions that will optimize 
the owners’ interest. In bid to optimize firm’s value managers are confronted with the agency problem. For 
instance, to increase the return on investment the manager must expose the firm to high level of risk that 
might not be convenient to the owner.  Consequently, solution can be offered to agency problems through 
capital structure decision, such as debt leverage increase. A positive correlation is assumed between leverage 
and firm performance in this theory.  
 
The market timing theory of capital structure dwell on managers’ consideration of time-varying relative 
costs of issuing debt and equity(Baker & Wurgler, 2002); (Graham & Harvey, 2001)(Hovakimian, Opler, & 
Titman, 2001);(Huang & Ritter, 2009); (Leary & Roberts, 2005); Myers, 1984). Firms change their 
debt/equity mix to take advantage of good prices from this market timing. Various authors have however, 
challenged the long continuance and the financial significance of this market timing(Alti, 2006);(Flannery & 
Rangan, 2006) . 
 
Capital structure and firm performance: The combination of firm’s debt (long-term and short term), 
common equity and preferred equity is known as capital structure and it is relevant to how a firm finances its 
overall operations and growth through the employment of different fund sources. Optimum capital structure 
simply mean a minimum weighted-average cost of capital that will maximize the firm’s worth(San, Theng and 
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Heng, 2011). For the attainment of  optimal capital structure therefore, numerous mixture of various 
securities will have to be issued.(Varcholova & Beslerova, 2013) claimed that capital structure and corporate 
performance are closely linked. De Jong & Zhejia (2013) claimed that capital structure and firm performance 
association is endogeneous. While (McConnell & Servaes, 1995) argued that Tobin’s q is endogeneous and 
leverage exogeneous , Smith and Watts affirmed that leverage is endogeneous sand Tobin’s q is exogeneous. 
This showed that capital structure decisions impact firm performance and firm performance also influences 
capital structure meaning that there is a bi-directional causal relationship. Capital structure and firm 
relationship was examined by Kinsman & Newman, (1999) they noted that capital structure choice(i.e. debt 
level) and firm’s performance association is very significant because shareholders wealth being the primary 
goal of a manager cannot be maximized until this relationship is critically examined .In the same manner, the 
effect of capital structure in 64 Egyptian firms were regressed against their firm performances from1997 to 
2005 by (El-Sayed Ebaid, 2009). A weak association was found between them. Abbadi and Abu-Rub (2012) 
studied the impact of market efficiency and capital structure on return on assets (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE) in eight out of ten Palestinian financial institutions from 2007 to 2010. A negative effect was found 
between leverage and market value of the bank while market value, ROA and bank deposits to total deposits 
were found to be positive and strongly associated. (La Rocca, 2007)) and(Maghyereh, 2005)in their   studies 
affirmed the link between firm’s value and its capital structure. Both studies observed that the efficiency of 
firm’s corporate governance policy could be influenced by the capital structure choice for instance; there 
could be a deliberate use of debt financing to reduce the information asymmetry problem (La Rocca, 2007). 
Akintoye (2008) studied the sensitivity of performance to capital structure on selected food and beverage 
companies in Nigeria. Significantly sensitive effects were found among performance indicators such as 
turnover, Earnings before Interest and Taxes, Earnings per Share, Dividend per Share, and the measures of 
leverage (Degree of operating leverage, Degree of Financial Leverage and Dividend per Share 
 
Profitability: In line with Pecking-order theory, a significantly  negative interplay was found between  debt 
financing and profitability (Hamid, Abdullah, & Kamaruzzaman, 2015).  Any viable firm that resolves to 
employ debt as its capital structure because of future profit must be subjected to the terms and conditions of 
the lenders. From this an inverse interplay is raised between profitability and leverage (Nadaraja et al, 2011). 
While trade-off hypothesis posit a direct association claiming that improved profit enhance debt usage with 
tax shield on interest payment pecking order suggests an inverse association between profitability and 
leverage. Toy, Stonehill, Remmers, Wright, and Beekhuisen (1974); Rajan and Zingales (1995) ; Silva 
Serrasqueiro and Rêgo Rogão (2009)equally supported this  negative association  empirically. 
 
Leverage: A higher operating leverage in a firm promotes greater chance of corporate failure and a greater 
weight of bankruptcy cost on financing decisions. Fixed costs of production also affect capital structure and 
can increase the instability in future earnings over time.  Agency and bankruptcy theories posit negative 
relation between operating leverage and debt level. The bankruptcy costs theory therefore, suggests a 
reduction on the debt level in capital structure once the operating leverage increases (Baral, 2004). 
 
Research Design: This study uses sampled panel data confined to listed companies in the Nigerian stock 
Exchange from 2005 to 2014 a ten-year window period to enable an examination of trend analysis. 30 listed 
companies were selected from a population of 173 using judgmental sampling technique on the basis of data 
availability. Secondary data were sourced from the Facts Book of the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) and the 
companies’ financial statements from the period 2005 to 2014 hence data set contains detailed information 
about each firm. 
 
Model Specification: Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA) are the common indicators of 
performance proxies used (Gorton & Rosen, 1995), (Mehran, 1995),(Krishnan & Moyer, 1997), (Ang, Cole, & 
Lin, 2000)and Zeitun and Tian(2007). However, ROA is widely regarded as the most useful measure to test 
firm performance (Abdel Shahid, 2003),  Zeitun and Tian (2007). The proxies (ROA and ROE) are adopted as 
Accounting Performance indices.  Accordingly, a functional relationship between firms’ Performance (PER) 
and the chosen explanatory variables (leverage, and size and tax)) is shown below:  
PER = f (LEV, Debt/Equity Mix, PAT, Lag_Pat, S, Tax) ----------------------------- (1)  
Where:   
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PER represents the different measures of performance (ROA, ROE)  
LEV showing the Ratio of Total Debt to Total Assets 
S is the size of the firms represented by the Log of Turnover 
Lag_Pat represent change in PAT over time 
Debt/Equity Mix connotes the Ratio of the Total Debt to the Shareholders Fund and  
Tax represents the corporate tax of the firms to the PAT.  
Where:  
ROA = Return on Asset and is measured by earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) divided by total assets  
ROE = Return on Equity, measured by earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) + Preference dividend), all 
divided by equity  
S = Size of the firm measured by Log of Turnover  
T = Tax measured as Total Corporate tax to earnings before interest and tax.  
 
PER components and the different independent measures inter play can be re-written thus: 
ROA it = f(Lev, Debt/Equity Mix, Lag_Pat,Size, Tax) ------------------------------- (2)  
ROE it = f(Lev, Debt/Equity Mix, Lag_Pat,Size, Tax) -------------------------------  (3)  
 
The following models are therefore relevant to the results of the tests of the stated hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis One  
Estimation Equation: 
========================= 
ROA(1) = C(-1) + C(2)*D_E_MIX(-1) + C(3)*LAG_PAT_(-1) + C(4)*PAT(-1) + C(5)*LEV(-1) + C(6)*SIZE(-1) + 
C(7)*TAX(-1) 
 
Hypothesis Two 
Estimation Equation: 
========================= 
ROE(1) = C(1) + C(2)*D_E_MIX(1) + C(3)*LAG_PAT_(1) + C(4)*LEV(1) + C(5)*PAT(1) + C(6)*SIZE(1) + 
C(7)*TAX(1) 
 
3. Methods of Estimation 
 
Descriptive statistics and an econometric technique of Panel data method were used to analyze the gathered 
data. Regression model in form of the Fixed Effects Model, Random Effects Model and the Pooled Ordinarily 
Least Square (OLS) model was employed to establish the most appropriate regression with the highest 
explanatory power that is better suited to the data set that is a balanced panel (Greene, 2003; Chen, 2004; 
Salawu, 2007). The Pooled Ordinary Least Square (POLS) was used in the first instance. However, in view of 
the weaknesses associated with it, Fixed Effects Model (FEM) and Random Effect Model (REM)  were used to 
capture the performance of the firms. The Hausman’s Chi-square statistics tested whether the Fixed Effects 
model estimator is an appropriate alternative to the Random Effects model (Judge et al., 2007; Zeitun and 
Tian, 2007). 
 
4. Data analysis and Findings 
 
The descriptive statistics of the dependent variable and the explanatory variables which shows a brief but 
concise sum of the distribution is given by table 1. The Regression Analyses between the period 2005 to 2014 
showing the relationship between the dependent and independent variables in order to test the earlier stated 
hypotheses were also presented. 
 
Descriptive Statistics: The table  below shows the descriptive statistics of the data for the period under 
review. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 D_E_MIX EPS LAG_PAT_ LEV PAT ROA ROE SIZE TAX 
 Mean  4.382943  1.967677  1465246.  0.551569  7716321.  0.090289  0.201615  7.486548  0.286705 
 Median  1.158886  1.640000  193000.0  0.529035  2789977.  0.055571  0.157641  7.670319  0.382828 
 Maximum  696.3355  458.4000  3.88E+08  1.766353  1.34E+08  1.809955  13.51818  8.828132  7.205523 
 Minimum -71.40651 -551.1600 -3.08E+08  0.033246 -2.81E+08 -0.789423 -20.87697  0.000000 -16.25982 
 Std. Dev.  40.83340  50.26933  34811010  0.288135  26106387  0.187823  1.832205  0.816254  1.298223 
 Skewness  16.43190 -3.719903  1.706279  0.376936 -3.336785  2.389876 -4.483651 -3.081116 -6.918560 
 Kurtosis  279.5853  87.24057  77.88035  3.284762  56.99420  29.33214  77.52003  25.79644  95.53062 
          
 Jarque-Bera  960046.1  88503.82  69531.57  8.036472  36628.89  8863.315  69716.38  6900.928  108323.1 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.017985  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
          
 Sum  1301.734  584.4000  4.35E+08  163.8159  2.29E+09  26.81585  59.87971  2223.505  85.15131 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  493540.6  747993.5  3.59E+17  24.57437  2.02E+17  10.44208  993.6647  197.2163  498.8733 
          
 Observations  297  297  297  297  297  297  297  297  297 
(Note: D_E_Mix = Total Debt/Total shareholders fund, LAG_PAT=Change in Turnover between Time ROA = 
PAT/Total Assets ROE= PAT/Shareholder Fund   Size= Log Turnover  Tax= Tax/PAT) 
(Source: Author’s Computation with the aid of E-View 9 Statistical Software Package) 
 
From the table 1 above, ROA and ROE show that Nigerian companies are not doing enough to satisfy the 
wealth maximization objective of the shareholders. The result shows that the mean of ROA is just 9% 
meaning that the corporations are less efficient in the utilization of its asset base showing an un-solid 
financial and operational performance in the period under. This abysmal performance can also be attributed 
to the high tax rate of 30% being levied against corporations in the country. The ratio of debt to equity 
deviated however from this general principle evidenced by the excessively high figure recorded as 16.43190. 
The conclusion from this is that Nigerian firms perhaps maintain a high level of  debt equity mix. The results 
of the skewness and kurtosis equally indicated that all the variables deviated from the one obtainable from a 
normal curve. Given the results therefore, all the variables are skewed more both to the right and left. 
Indicating more positive and negative observations because it is far above the 0.0 normal level of skewness 
for distributions showing to a large extent how the  instability in the socio, economic and political situations 
in the country affects organizations in the country. 
 
Test of Hypotheses: In order to confirm the veracity or otherwise of the stated hypotheses, Unit root test, 
cross sectional test, Hausman test and correlation analysis tests are conducted. 
 
Test For Stationary (Unit Root Test): To test for stationary the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit Root 
Test Approach was used  to ensure that the various parameters are estimated using stationary time series 
data. Thus, the study seeks to avoid the occurrence of bogus and unrealistic outcome. 
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This position can be further demonstrated by the graphs below:
A graphical presentation of the dependent and the independent variables used for the study 
(Source: E-View Generated Output by the Researcher, 2016) 
 
Table 2: ADF Unit Root Test 
VARIABLES  ADF  PVALUE ORDER OF INTEGRATION 
EPS   133.856 0.0000  I(1)  
LAG_PAT  102.503 0.0005  I(1) 
LEV   91.7346 0.0052  I(1) 
PAT   99.2833 0.0011  I(1) 
ROA   116.140 0.0000  I(1) 
ROE   108.449 0.0001  I(1) 
SIZE   106.270 0.0002  I(1) 
TAX   125.256 0.0000  I(1) 
D_E_MIX  115.398 0.0000  I(1)  
(Source: Author’s computation with the aid of E-Views 9, 2016) 
 
Form table 2 above, it can be observed that the data does not suffer any stationary problem at first 
differential level at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significant. Therefore, the result of the regression model can be 
relied upon at these levels. The study concluded that all the variables under consideration did not have unit 
root and were therefore used in levels instead of their first difference. This means that the results obtained 
were not spurious (Gujarati, 2003). 
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Table 3: Model Specification 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Date: 02/26/16   Time: 10:23   
Sample: 2005 2014   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 30   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 300  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C -0.043255 0.110962 -0.389819 0.6970 
D_E_MIX 2.01E-05 0.000237 0.084946 0.9324 
LAG_PAT_ 1.54E-10 3.95E-10 0.390312 0.6966 
LEV -0.153284 0.037366 -4.102253 0.0001 
PAT 1.03E-09 5.76E-10 1.791208 0.0743 
SIZE 0.027684 0.014449 1.915987 0.0563 
TAX 0.006809 0.007276 0.935690 0.3502 
          
 Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
          
Cross-section random 0.074095 0.1880 
Idiosyncratic random 0.153978 0.8120 
          
 Weighted Statistics   
          
R-squared 0.104326     Mean dependent var 0.049155 
Adjusted R-squared 0.085985     S.D. dependent var 0.162580 
S.E. of regression 0.155433     Sum squared resid 7.078717 
F-statistic 5.687990     Durbin-Watson stat 1.727435 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000013    
          
 Unweighted Statistics   
          
R-squared 0.151494     Mean dependent var 0.089505 
Sum squared resid 8.875997     Durbin-Watson stat 1.377651 
          
(Source: Author’s Computation with the aid of E-View 9 Statistical Software Package)  
 
Cointegration Test: The purpose of the cointegration test is to determine whether a group of non-stationary 
series is cointegrated or not. As explained below, the presence of a cointegrating relation forms the basis of 
the VEC specification. E-Views implements VAR-based cointegration tests using the methodology developed 
in (Johansen, 1995).  
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Table 4: Cointegration Test 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates   
 Date: 10/02/16   Time: 02:19   
 Sample (adjusted): 4 300   
 Included observations: 199 after adjustments  
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]  
     
     
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1    
     
     
LROA(-1)  1.000000    
     
LD_E_MIX(-1)  210.8648    
  (44.8560)    
 [ 4.70093]    
     
LSIZE(-1) -1679.119    
  (533.143)    
 [-3.14947]    
     
LTAX(-1)  552.6438    
  (86.8376)    
 [ 6.36411]    
     
C  3941.367    
     
     
Error Correction: D(LROA) D(LD_E_MIX) D(LSIZE) D(LTAX) 
          
CointEq1  0.000628 -0.000208  3.34E-05 -0.001082 
  (0.00019)  (0.00019)  (1.1E-05)  (0.00020) 
 [ 3.33521] [-1.07631] [ 3.17086] [-5.48903] 
     
D(LROA(-1)) -0.171168 -0.034684  0.000409 -0.035291 
  (0.07791)  (0.08013)  (0.00436)  (0.08153) 
 [-2.19704] [-0.43287] [ 0.09399] [-0.43284] 
     
D(LROA(-2)) -0.196980 -0.053935  0.005020  0.036314 
  (0.08058)  (0.08287)  (0.00451)  (0.08432) 
 [-2.44463] [-0.65083] [ 1.11436] [ 0.43065] 
     
D(LD_E_MIX(-1)) -0.077309 -0.160060 -0.002596  0.081357 
  (0.07747)  (0.07968)  (0.00433)  (0.08108) 
 [-0.99787] [-2.00880] [-0.59939] [ 1.00344] 
     
D(LD_E_MIX(-2)) -0.061557 -0.135062 -0.004443  0.053216 
  (0.07339)  (0.07548)  (0.00410)  (0.07680) 
 [-0.83876] [-1.78940] [-1.08274] [ 0.69288] 
     
D(LSIZE(-1)) -1.082608  0.089868 -0.067931 -2.844558 
  (1.24684)  (1.28234)  (0.06971)  (1.30484) 
 [-0.86828] [ 0.07008] [-0.97445] [-2.18001] 
     
D(LSIZE(-2)) -0.993946 -1.405566 -0.067012  1.498184 
  (1.28776)  (1.32442)  (0.07200)  (1.34765) 
 [-0.77184] [-1.06127] [-0.93072] [ 1.11170] 
     
D(LTAX(-1)) -0.236554 -0.007973 -0.016056 -0.094817 
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  (0.10121)  (0.10409)  (0.00566)  (0.10592) 
 [-2.33727] [-0.07659] [-2.83744] [-0.89520] 
     
D(LTAX(-2)) -0.188292  0.126241  0.003013  0.017590 
  (0.08263)  (0.08499)  (0.00462)  (0.08648) 
 [-2.27863] [ 1.48543] [ 0.65208] [ 0.20340] 
     
C -0.048195  0.006304  0.003454  0.025740 
  (0.05558)  (0.05716)  (0.00311)  (0.05817) 
 [-0.86712] [ 0.11028] [ 1.11161] [ 0.44254] 
          
 R-squared  0.130103  0.094374  0.111986  0.336582 
 Adj. R-squared  0.088679  0.051249  0.069700  0.304991 
 Sum sq. resids  114.5642  121.1795  0.358134  125.4691 
 S.E. equation  0.778563  0.800726  0.043530  0.814775 
 F-statistic  3.140782  2.188387  2.648277  10.65426 
 Log likelihood -227.4279 -233.0136  346.4864 -236.4748 
 Akaike AIC  2.386210  2.442348 -3.381772  2.477134 
 Schwarz SC  2.551703  2.607841 -3.216280  2.642627 
 Mean dependent -0.059902  0.013583  0.003091  0.024082 
 S.D. dependent  0.815564  0.822068  0.045132  0.977332 
          
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  0.000315   
 Determinant resid covariance  0.000257   
 Log likelihood -306.7729   
 Akaike information criterion  3.525356   
 Schwarz criterion  4.253524   
          (Source: Author’s Computation with the aid of E-View 9 Statistical Software Package)  
 
Estimation Proc: 
=============================== 
EC(C,1) 1 2 LROA LD_E_MIX LSIZE LTAX  
 
VAR Model: 
=============================== 
D(LROA) = A(1,1)*(B(1,1)*LROA(-1) + B(1,2)*LD_E_MIX(-1) + B(1,3)*LSIZE(-1) + B(1,4)*LTAX(-1) + B(1,5)) + 
C(1,1)*D(LROA(-1)) + C(1,2)*D(LROA(-2)) + C(1,3)*D(LD_E_MIX(-1)) + C(1,4)*D(LD_E_MIX(-2)) + C(1,5)*D(LSIZE(-1)) + 
C(1,6)*D(LSIZE(-2)) + C(1,7)*D(LTAX(-1)) + C(1,8)*D(LTAX(-2)) + C(1,9) 
 
D(LD_E_MIX) = A(2,1)*(B(1,1)*LROA(-1) + B(1,2)*LD_E_MIX(-1) + B(1,3)*LSIZE(-1) + B(1,4)*LTAX(-1) + B(1,5)) + 
C(2,1)*D(LROA(-1)) + C(2,2)*D(LROA(-2)) + C(2,3)*D(LD_E_MIX(-1)) + C(2,4)*D(LD_E_MIX(-2)) + C(2,5)*D(LSIZE(-1)) + 
C(2,6)*D(LSIZE(-2)) + C(2,7)*D(LTAX(-1)) + C(2,8)*D(LTAX(-2)) + C(2,9) 
 
D(LSIZE) = A(3,1)*(B(1,1)*LROA(-1) + B(1,2)*LD_E_MIX(-1) + B(1,3)*LSIZE(-1) + B(1,4)*LTAX(-1) + B(1,5)) + 
C(3,1)*D(LROA(-1)) + C(3,2)*D(LROA(-2)) + C(3,3)*D(LD_E_MIX(-1)) + C(3,4)*D(LD_E_MIX(-2)) + C(3,5)*D(LSIZE(-1)) + 
C(3,6)*D(LSIZE(-2)) + C(3,7)*D(LTAX(-1)) + C(3,8)*D(LTAX(-2)) + C(3,9) 
 
D(LTAX) = A(4,1)*(B(1,1)*LROA(-1) + B(1,2)*LD_E_MIX(-1) + B(1,3)*LSIZE(-1) + B(1,4)*LTAX(-1) + B(1,5)) + 
C(4,1)*D(LROA(-1)) + C(4,2)*D(LROA(-2)) + C(4,3)*D(LD_E_MIX(-1)) + C(4,4)*D(LD_E_MIX(-2)) + C(4,5)*D(LSIZE(-1)) + 
C(4,6)*D(LSIZE(-2)) + C(4,7)*D(LTAX(-1)) + C(4,8)*D(LTAX(-2)) + C(4,9) 
 
VAR Model - Substituted Coefficients: 
=============================== 
D(LROA) = 0.000628013538327*( LROA(-1) + 210.86481268*LD_E_MIX(-1) - 1679.11940652*LSIZE(-1) + 
552.643838719*LTAX(-1) + 3941.36659573 ) - 0.171167978772*D(LROA(-1)) - 0.196979676359*D(LROA(-2)) - 
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0.0773087850168*D(LD_E_MIX(-1)) - 0.0615567088303*D(LD_E_MIX(-2)) - 1.08260807335*D(LSIZE(-1)) - 
0.993945771353*D(LSIZE(-2)) - 0.236553624592*D(LTAX(-1)) - 0.188292442889*D(LTAX(-2)) - 0.048194563484 
 
D(LD_E_MIX) =  - 0.000208437141995*( LROA(-1) + 210.86481268*LD_E_MIX(-1) - 1679.11940652*LSIZE(-1) + 
552.643838719*LTAX(-1) + 3941.36659573 ) - 0.034683797206*D(LROA(-1)) - 0.0539348102886*D(LROA(-2)) - 
0.160060232021*D(LD_E_MIX(-1)) - 0.135061807735*D(LD_E_MIX(-2)) + 0.0898676215657*D(LSIZE(-1)) - 
1.40556622776*D(LSIZE(-2)) - 0.00797257050475*D(LTAX(-1)) + 0.126241446521*D(LTAX(-2)) + 0.00630407410369 
 
D(LSIZE) = 3.3382710472e-05*( LROA(-1) + 210.86481268*LD_E_MIX(-1) - 1679.11940652*LSIZE(-1) + 
552.643838719*LTAX(-1) + 3941.36659573 ) + 0.000409430424652*D(LROA(-1)) + 0.00502032819494*D(LROA(-2)) - 
0.00259634807929*D(LD_E_MIX(-1)) - 0.00444281055602*D(LD_E_MIX(-2)) - 0.0679313763568*D(LSIZE(-1)) - 
0.0670120989649*D(LSIZE(-2)) - 0.0160563486456*D(LTAX(-1)) + 0.00301269768048*D(LTAX(-2)) + 
0.00345435996113 
 
D(LTAX) =  - 0.00108164849559*( LROA(-1) + 210.86481268*LD_E_MIX(-1) - 1679.11940652*LSIZE(-1) + 
552.643838719*LTAX(-1) + 3941.36659573 ) - 0.0352905517191*D(LROA(-1)) + 0.0363142631026*D(LROA(-2)) + 
0.0813565109973*D(LD_E_MIX(-1)) + 0.0532156161253*D(LD_E_MIX(-2)) - 2.84455751061*D(LSIZE(-1)) + 
1.49818366069*D(LSIZE(-2)) - 0.0948167019604*D(LTAX(-1)) + 0.0175898298285*D(LTAX(-2)) + 0.0257401237614 
 
Table 5: Cointegration Test 
Date: 10/02/16   Time: 02:34   
Sample (adjusted): 5 300   
Included observations: 177 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: COINTEQ01     
Exogenous series: LROA LD_E_MIX LEPS LSIZE LTAX   
Warning: Critical values assume no exogenous series  
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1  
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     
None *  0.214032  42.62848  3.841466  0.0000 
          
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegratingeqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
          
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
          
None *  0.214032  42.62848  3.841466  0.0000 
          
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegratingeqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
 
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):  
          
COINTEQ01     
 0.346297     
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):   
          D(COINTEQ01) -2.026673    
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Decision: The probability 0.0000 is less than the 5% critical level, meaning that the null hypothesis will be 
accepted i.e. there is co-integration. Therefore the assumption of the panel VAR model has been fulfilled. 
Hence it can be concluded that there is long run association between the dependent variable and independent 
variables. 
 
Testing for random and fixed effects on Variables: The Hausman Test was conducted to determine which 
model bests suited this research work. 
 
Table 6: Hausman Test 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section random 11.563277 6 0.0725 
          
     
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
          
D_E_MIX -0.000009 0.000020 0.000000 0.5058 
LAG_PAT_ 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.3647 
LEV -0.122447 -0.153284 0.000344 0.0965 
PAT 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.3988 
SIZE 0.009634 0.027684 0.000076 0.0384 
TAX 0.006171 0.006809 0.000001 0.5757 
          
     
Cross-section random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 09/26/15   Time: 10:26   
Sample: 2005 2014   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 30   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 300  
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C 0.073950 0.130060 0.568581 0.5701 
D_E_MIX -9.00E-06 0.000241 -0.037395 0.9702 
LAG_PAT_ 6.42E-11 4.08E-10 0.157572 0.8749 
LEV -0.122447 0.041719 -2.935035 0.0036 
PAT 1.21E-09 6.12E-10 1.971021 0.0498 
SIZE 0.009634 0.016876 0.570859 0.5686 
TAX 0.006171 0.007365 0.837900 0.4028 
          
 Effects Specification   
          
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
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R-squared 0.401644     Mean dependent var 0.089505 
Adjusted R-squared 0.322316     S.D. dependent var 0.187045 
S.E. of regression 0.153978     Akaike info criterion -0.791846 
Sum squared resid 6.259247     Schwarz criterion -0.347392 
Log likelihood 154.7768     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.613974 
F-statistic 5.063112     Durbin-Watson stat 1.928403 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
          
 
Table 7: Fixed Effect Model (ROA as a Measure of Performance) 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 02/26/16   Time: 10:29   
Sample: 2005- 2014   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 30   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 300  
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C 0.073950 0.130060 0.568581 0.5701 
D_E_MIX -9.00E-06 0.000241 -0.037395 0.9702 
LAG_PAT_ 6.42E-11 4.08E-10 0.157572 0.8749 
LEV -0.122447 0.041719 -2.935035 0.0036 
PAT 1.21E-09 6.12E-10 1.971021 0.0498 
SIZE 0.009634 0.016876 0.570859 0.5686 
TAX 0.006171 0.007365 0.837900 0.4028 
          
 Effects Specification   
          
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
          
R-squared 0.401644     Mean dependent var 0.089505 
Adjusted R-squared 0.322316     S.D. dependent var 0.187045 
S.E. of regression 0.153978     Akaike info criterion -0.791846 
Sum squared resid 6.259247     Schwarz criterion -0.347392 
Log likelihood 154.7768     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.613974 
F-statistic 5.063112     Durbin-Watson stat 1.928403 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
          
(Source: Author’s Computation with the aid of E-View 9 Statistical Software Package)  
Estimation Equation: 
========================= 
ROA = C(1) + C(2)*D_E_MIX + C(3)*LAG_PAT_ + C(4)*LEV + C(5)*PAT + C(6)*SIZE + C(7)*TAX + [CX=F] 
 
Substituted Coefficients: 
========================= 
ROA = 0.0739495601434 - 8.99512089698e-06*D_E_MIX + 6.42411025566e-11*LAG_PAT_ - 
0.122447231257*LEV + 1.2060113731e-09*PAT + 0.00963393786441*SIZE + 0.0061711847609*TAX + 
[CX=F] 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
Table 8: Random Effect Model (ROE as Measure of Performance) 
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 02/26/16   Time: 09:51   
Sample: 2005 2014   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 30   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 300  
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -0.231721 0.751073 -0.308520 0.7579 
D_E_MIX -0.031396 0.001968 -15.94941 0.0000 
LAG_PAT_ -2.75E-09 3.25E-09 -0.847844 0.3972 
LEV 0.499759 0.270315 1.848802 0.0655 
PAT 4.16E-09 4.46E-09 0.931895 0.3522 
SIZE 0.036448 0.099638 0.365808 0.7148 
TAX -0.024265 0.061428 -0.395024 0.6931 
          
R-squared 0.479956     Mean dependent var 0.200993 
Adjusted R-squared 0.469307     S.D. dependent var 1.823057 
S.E. of regression 1.328073     Akaike info criterion 3.428391 
Sum squared resid 516.7867     Schwarz criterion 3.514813 
Log likelihood -507.2587     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.462978 
F-statistic 45.06906     Durbin-Watson stat 1.781037 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
          
In order to choose between fixed and random effects model for model 1 ROA, Hausman test was used. The 
null hypothesis of the Hausman test was that the Random Effects Model was preferred to the Fixed Effects 
Model. For ROA model, Hausman test reported a chi-square of 11.563277 with a p-value of 0.0725 implying 
that at 5 percent level, the chi-square value obtained was statistically significant. Therefore,  researcher failed 
to accept the null hypothesis which states  that random effects model was preferred to fixed effect model for 
ROA.  
 
Table 9: Hausman Test 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
          
Cross-section random 2.307318 6 0.8894 
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
          
D_E_MIX -0.031381 -0.031387 0.000000 0.9857 
LAG_PAT_ -0.000000 -0.000000 0.000000 0.8918 
LEV 0.569513 0.543816 0.019245 0.8530 
PAT 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.8582 
SIZE 0.040402 0.040505 0.004280 0.9987 
TAX -0.054187 -0.045691 0.000072 0.3158 
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Cross-section random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 02/26/16   Time: 10:35   
Sample: 2005- 2014   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 30   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 300  
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C -0.285370 1.015609 -0.280984 0.7789 
D_E_MIX -0.031381 0.001878 -16.70682 0.0000 
LAG_PAT_ -2.45E-09 3.18E-09 -0.769113 0.4425 
LEV 0.569513 0.325776 1.748174 0.0816 
PAT 3.28E-09 4.78E-09 0.687350 0.4925 
SIZE 0.040402 0.131783 0.306578 0.7594 
TAX -0.054187 0.057512 -0.942189 0.3470 
          
 Effects Specification   
          
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
          
R-squared 0.615924     Mean dependent var 0.200993 
Adjusted R-squared 0.565005     S.D. dependent var 1.823057 
S.E. of regression 1.202381     Akaike info criterion 3.318652 
Sum squared resid 381.6703     Schwarz criterion 3.763106 
Log likelihood -461.7978     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.496523 
F-statistic 12.09613     Durbin-Watson stat 2.389747 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
          
(Source: Author’s Computation with the aid of E-View 9 Statistical Software Package)  
 
Table 10: Fixed Effect Model (ROE as a Measure of Profitability) 
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 02/26/16   Time: 10:39   
Sample: 2005- 2014   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 30   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 300  
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -0.285370 1.015609 -0.280984 0.7789 
D_E_MIX -0.031381 0.001878 -16.70682 0.0000 
LAG_PAT_ -2.45E-09 3.18E-09 -0.769113 0.4425 
LEV 0.569513 0.325776 1.748174 0.0816 
PAT 3.28E-09 4.78E-09 0.687350 0.4925 
SIZE 0.040402 0.131783 0.306578 0.7594 
TAX -0.054187 0.057512 -0.942189 0.3470 
          
 Effects Specification   
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Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
          
R-squared 0.615924     Mean dependent var 0.200993 
Adjusted R-squared 0.565005     S.D. dependent var 1.823057 
S.E. of regression 1.202381     Akaike info criterion 3.318652 
Sum squared resid 381.6703     Schwarz criterion 3.763106 
Log likelihood -461.7978     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.496523 
F-statistic 12.09613     Durbin-Watson stat 2.389747 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
          
 
Estimation Equation: 
========================= 
ROE = C(1) + C(2)*D_E_MIX + C(3)*LAG_PAT_ + C(4)*LEV + C(5)*PAT + C(6)*SIZE + C(7)*TAX + [CX=F] 
 
Substituted Coefficients: 
========================= 
ROE = -0.285369701672 - 0.0313812465684*D_E_MIX - 2.44854340447e-09*LAG_PAT_ + 
0.569512672136*LEV + 3.28413805967e-09*PAT + 0.0404016968541*SIZE - 0.054187291596*TAX + 
[CX=F] 
 
The Hausman test was used to choose between fixed and random effects for model 2. The null hypothesis of 
the Hausman test was that the Random Effects Model was preferred to the Fixed Effects Model. For ROE 
model, Hausman test reported a chi-square of 2.307318 with a p-value of 0.8894 implying that at 5 percent 
level, the chi-square value obtained was statistically significant. The researcher therefore failed to accept the 
null hypothesis that random effects model was preferred to fixed effect model for ROE.  
 
Test of hypothesis: In order to establish the veracity or otherwise of the stated hypotheses, Regression 
analysis and Co-efficient of Correlation tests were conducted  between the dependent and the independent 
variables. 
 
Hypothesis  One 
Ho: Financial Leverage does not significantly affect the profitability of Nigerian-listed companies. 
 
Estimation Equation: 
========================= 
ROA(-1) = C(1) + C(2)*D_E_MIX(-1) + C(3)*LAG_PAT_(-1) + C(4)*PAT(-1) + C(5)*LEV(-1) + C(6)*SIZE(-1) + 
C(7)*TAX(-1) 
 
Substituted Coefficients: 
========================= 
ROA(-1) = -0.199845637401 - 4.49017656522e-06*D_E_MIX(-1) + 2.43125939918e-10*LAG_PAT_(-1) + 
5.90567228179e-10*PAT(-1) - 0.197988086624*LEV(-1) + 0.0530055949528*SIZE(-1) - 3.21944614023e-
10*TAX(-1) 
 
Table 11: Regression Analysis 
Dependent Variable: ROA(-1)   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 02/13/16   Time: 09:48   
Sample (adjusted): 2005 2014   
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 30   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 270  
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -0.199846 0.106719 -1.872627 0.0622 
D_E_MIX(-1) -4.49E-06 0.000252 -0.017826 0.9858 
LAG_PAT_(-1) 2.43E-10 4.83E-10 0.502850 0.6155 
PAT(-1) 5.91E-10 6.74E-10 0.876701 0.3814 
LEV(-1) -0.197988 0.037421 -5.290879 0.0000 
SIZE(-1) 0.053006 0.014274 3.713515 0.0002 
TAX(-1) -3.22E-10 2.21E-09 -0.145734 0.8842 
          
R-squared 0.159492     Mean dependent var 0.090970 
Adjusted R-squared 0.140317     S.D. dependent var 0.189303 
S.E. of regression 0.175520     Akaike info criterion -0.616542 
Sum squared resid 8.102329     Schwarz criterion -0.523249 
Log likelihood 90.23311     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.579079 
F-statistic 8.317691     Durbin-Watson stat 1.500984 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
          
(Source: Author’s Computation with the aid of E-View 9 Statistical Software Package)  
 
Table 11 above presents the summary of regression results of model 1. In this table, ROA (which is measured 
by Profits after Tax (PAT) divided by Total Assets of the firm) was regressed against six independent 
variables: Debt/Equity Mix, Lag_Pat, PAT, Lev, Size and Tax. A coefficient of determination (R2) of 14 percent 
was produced meaning  that14 per cent proportion variability occurring in ROA can be explained by the its 
relationship with the independent variables  while the remaining 86 percent is explained  by other variables 
outside the model showing that the model has a good fit. The F-statistics (8.31) is statistically significant at 
5% level of significant.  Durbin- Watson (DW) of 1.5 shows that the model specified is free from the problem 
of serial auto-correlation. The autocorrelation among regression model residuals have been tested using 
Durbin-Watson factors, if Durbin Watson factors are between 1 and 3,there is no autocorrelation problem 
(Alsaeed, 2005). As shown in table (11), all Durbin-Watson factors are less than 3, so there is no 
autocorrelation problem in the regression models. 
 
Table 12: Correlation Coefficient 
 ROA 
DEBT/EQY 
MIX LAG_PAT_ LEV PAT SIZE TAX 
ROA 1       
DEBT/EQY MIX -0.0378 1      
LAG_PAT_ 0.1322 0.0007 1     
LEV -0.2834 0.1221 0.0252 1    
+PAT 0.1676 0.0002 0.7175 0.1047 1   
SIZE 0.2258 0.0039 0.0361 0.0601 0.2461 1  
TAX 0.0819 -0.2581 -0.0024 -0.0675 0.0211 0.0694 1 
(Source: Author’s Computation with the aid of E-View 9 Statistical Software Package)  
 
As presented in table 11, the correlation coefficients for all variables were less than 0.8 implying that the 
study data did not exhibit severe multicollinearity as recommended by (Gujarati, 2003;(Cooper & Schindler, 
2008). The regression results presented in table 12 indicate that the coefficient of capital structure 
(represented by Debt/Equity ratio) of -0.0378 was insignificant statistically at 1 percent level with p-value of 
0.9501. A negative interplay though insignificant was found between financial leverage and performance of 
listed firms. These findings were contrary with the capital structure irrelevance theory of  Modigliani& Miller 
(1963) which argued that the debt amount in the capital structure does not impact firm’s performance and 
value. Abdul (2012) however found a negatively significant interplay between financial leverage and firm 
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performance as measured by Return on Assets (ROA). The findings of this research is in contrast with the 
findings ofSaeedi and Mahmoodi (2011), who claimed a positive a positive association exists between 
financial leverage and performance as measured by Return on Assets. The same can be said on the 
relationship between the Total Liabilities/ Total Assets (represented by Lev) of Nigerian listed firms and the 
financial performance as represented by Return on Assets. From the table, the co efficient is -0.2843is 
consistent with Afza and Nazir (2007)and Mwangi, Muathe, and Kosimbei (2014)who found a negative 
association between the aggressiveness of financing policy and accounting profit. Also, a negatively 
significant association was established between capital structure as measured by LTDTA, STDTA, and TDTE 
and firm’s profitability (PROF), while an insignificantly negative interplay was found between TDTA and 
firm’s profitability measure (PROF). 
 
Hypothesis Two 
Ho: There is no significant correlation between Financial Leverage mix and the financial performance of 
Nigerian-listed companies. 
 
Estimation Equation: 
========================= 
ROE(-1) = C(1) + C(2)*D_E_MIX(-1) + C(3)*LAG_PAT_(-1) + C(4)*PAT(-1) + C(5)*LEV(-1) + C(6)*SIZE(-1) + 
C(7)*TAX(-1) 
 
Substituted Coefficients: 
========================= 
ROE(-1) = -0.58908624776 - 0.0312935663637*D_E_MIX(-1) - 1.78122996494e-09*LAG_PAT_(-1) + 
4.0910623105e-09*PAT(-1) + 0.635565927636*LEV(-1) + 0.0839240048998*SIZE(-1) - 2.34437680666e-
08*TAX(-1) 
 
Table 13: Regression Analysis 
Dependent Variable: ROE(-1)   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 02/13/16   Time: 09:54   
Sample (adjusted): 2005 2014   
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 30   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 270  
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -0.589086 0.844603 -0.697472 0.4861 
D_E_MIX(-1) -0.031294 0.001993 -15.69801 0.0000 
LAG_PAT_(-1) -1.78E-09 3.83E-09 -0.465498 0.6420 
PAT(-1) 4.09E-09 5.33E-09 0.767378 0.4435 
LEV(-1) 0.635566 0.296156 2.146052 0.0328 
SIZE(-1) 0.083924 0.112965 0.742917 0.4582 
TAX(-1) -2.34E-08 1.75E-08 -1.340904 0.1811 
          
R-squared 0.486290     Mean dependent var 0.199530 
Adjusted R-squared 0.474570     S.D. dependent var 1.916368 
S.E. of regression 1.389108     Akaike info criterion 3.520785 
Sum squared resid 507.4906     Schwarz criterion 3.614077 
Log likelihood -468.3060     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.558247 
F-statistic 41.49366     Durbin-Watson stat 1.823242 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
          (Source: Author’s Computation with the aid of E-View 9 Statistical Software Package)  
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Table 13 above presents the regression summary of model 1. In this table, Return on Equity (which is 
measured by Profit after Tax (PAT) divided by Shareholder’s Fund of the firm) was regressed against six 
independent variables: Debt/Equity Mix, Lag_Pat, PAT, Lev, Size and Tax. A coefficient of determination (R2) 
of 48 percent was gotten. 48 per cent of the variation occurring in roe can be explained by its relationship 
with the independent variables  while the remaining 52 per cent is accounted for by other variables outside 
the model which shows that there exists goodness of fit. The F-statistics (41.49) is statistically significant at 
5% level of significant which shows that the model is well specified. Non-auto correlation is absent with 
Durbin- Watson (DW) of 1.8. The autocorrelation among regression model residuals have been tested using 
Durbin-Watson factors, if Durbin Watson factors are between 1 and 3,there is no autocorrelation problem 
(Alsaeed, 2005).As shown in table (3), the Durbin-Watson factors are less than 3, so there is no 
autocorrelation problem in the regression models. 
 
Table 14: Correlation Co-efficient 
 ROE DEBT/EQY MIX LAG_PAT_ LEV PAT SIZE TAX 
ROE 1       
DEBT/EQY MIX -0.6856 1      
LAG_PAT_ -0.0075 0.0007 1     
LEV 0.0008 0.1221 0.0252 1    
PAT 0.0339 0.0002 0.7175 0.1047 1   
SIZE 0.0299 0.0039 0.0361 0.0601 0.2461 1  
TAX 0.1605 -0.2581 -0.0024 -0.0675 0.0211 0.0694 1 
(Source: Author’s Computation with the aid of E-View 9 Statistical Software Package)  
 
As presented in table 4.14, the correlation coefficients for all variables were less than 0.8 implying that the 
study data did not exhibit severe multicollinearity as recommended by (Gujarati, 2003; Cooper & Schindler, 
2008). The regression result in table 1V indicate that the coefficient for Debt/Equity mix - 0.6856 and at 1% it 
is significant statistically , with p-value of 0.0000 .A negatively significant association exist between 
debt/equity and performance in the Nigerian quoted companies as measured by Return on Equity. These 
results supports the negative interplay between financial leverage and ROE findings of (Kaumbuthu, 
2011)but contradicts the positively significant association of Akhtar, Javed, Maryam, and Sadia (2012) and 
the Agency Theory of Jensen & Meckling (1976). 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
This study focused on capital structure and Nigerian listed firm’s performance  with the aims of ascertaining 
the relationship between their performances by looking at some components of capital structure in their 
finances. Leverage was found to impact negatively on profitability at 1% significant level from the first 
objective. This is contrary to the aprori expectation for a direct association between profit and debt ratio as 
supported by agency cost theory preference for increased in financing when agency problem becomes 
pronounced. This also is a behavioral justification for the traditional approach that claimed that debt and 
equity should be mix appropriately in order to enhance firm’s performance. It is therefore recommended that 
firms should ensure that finance mix should keep debt ratio lower even when facing agency problems. 
Secondly, the study set out to ascertain the relationship between Equity/Debt mix financing and performance 
of Nigerian listed firms. Just like the debt ratio, the result in the second objective showed an insignificantly 
indirect association between leverage and firm’s performance. That is, equity/debt finances influences 
performance negatively. This is in conformity with our apriori expectation because from agency cost theory 
angle, firm’s performance will be worsen by debt financing. From this result, it can be deduced that 
profitability will be enhanced in the Nigerian listed firms with equity financing hence the rejection of  the null 
hypothesis 2 for predicting there is no relationship between Financial Leverage mix and the financial 
performance of Nigerian companies. Nigerian government should provide financial succor through the 
Central bank of Nigeria Policy by encouraging financial institutions to grant affordable debt finance to boost 
corporate growth. Firms should use long-term liabilities to finance firms’ activities because current liabilities 
will negatively affect firms’ performance. Equally, managers should gauge the cost of debt vis-à-vis 
72 
 
profitability and taxation to select the best mix. Debt and equity should be mixed appropriately and ensure 
that debt financing ratio is lower to enhance corporate financial performance. 
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